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The Suffragist Peace
- Joslyn N. Barnhart, Robert F. Trager, Elizabeth N. Saunders, Allan Dafoe
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- International Organization / Volume 74 / Issue 4 / Fall 2020
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 29 October 2020, pp. 633-670
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- Fall 2020
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Preferences for conflict and cooperation are systematically different for men and women: across a variety of contexts, women generally prefer more peaceful options and are less supportive of making threats and initiating conflict. But how do these preferences affect states’ decisions for war and patterns of conflict at the international level, such as the democratic peace? Women have increasingly participated in political decision making over the last century because of suffragist movements. But although there is a large body of research on the democratic peace, the role of women's suffrage has gone unexplored. Drawing on theory, a meta-analysis of survey experiments in international relations, and analysis of crossnational conflict data, we show how features of women's preferences about the use of force translate into specific patterns of international conflict. When empowered by democratic institutions and suffrage, women's more pacific preferences generate a dyadic democratic peace (i.e., between democracies), as well as a monadic peace. Our analysis supports the view that the enfranchisement of women is essential for the democratic peace.
Index
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 284-288
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4 - The Risk of a Breach
- from PART I - THEORY
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 71-102
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Summary
During the Great Eastern Crisis of 1876, Russia queried Germany what its position would be if Russia were to go to war with Austria–Hungary. Russia and Austria–Hungary were engaged in tense negotiations over the Russian desire to respond to Ottoman violence against Slavs. Germany did not wish to reply to Russia at all, but learned that the Tsar was asking about the German response nearly every day. So, Germany sent General von Schweinitz by train to a private audience with Tsar. Schweinitz communicated, as delicately as he possibly could, that Germany could not guarantee its neutrality in the event of war, and that “a lasting weakening of Austria would be contrary to [German] interests.” The German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, thought that this created a “new situation” in European politics. Germany had increased Russian expectations about Germany's willingness to go to war on behalf of Austria, and perhaps decreased Russia's appraisal of the extent to which Germany would support Russian aims generally.
According to most theories of communication between states, this should have been impossible. Germany communicated its position privately through diplomatic channels. Thus, German elites did not stake their reputation before a domestic audience, nor did their actions carry explicit costs, two commonly recognized mechanisms of communication. Further, Germany's noncommittal statements can hardly be considered to have engaged its reputation before the Russian and interstate audiences such that anyone could have believed Germany significantly less willing to back down for fear of the repercussions of having been caught in a bluff. Theories of communication that rely on the staking of bargaining reputations, therefore, also fail to explain the case. Yet, Bismarck's appraisal was correct: thereafter, Russia reckoned on German support for Austria–Hungary. Why should the statements of ambassadors have such an impact?
This chapter describes a signaling mechanism that explains this case and many others. When a state is threatened, if it is not willing to concede the issue, and sometimes even if it is, it will often reorient its foreign policy. It may form new alliances, build weapons, initiate a first strike against the threatener, mobilize troops, or adopt policies to drain the resources of the menacing state. These actions have consequences for the threatening state whether or not that state decides to follow through on its threat.
PART II - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 147-150
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8 - How Germany Weighed British Resolve in 1938–1939
- from PART II - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 174-191
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Summary
The confluence of imperialist ideologies, power and opportunity produces extreme violence in the international system from time to time. In the aftermath, the question arises whether actions taken in time might have averted the disaster. Could carefully conceived diplomatic interventions have altered the paths of Napoleonic France or Imperial Japan? Many observers of international affairs have argued that well-calculated diplomacy can indeed influence world affairs to this degree. Russian statesmen believed, for instance, that Prussia's rise to power in Germany was postponed for more than a decade by the Tsar's personal intervention in 1850 in a dispute between Prussia and Austria. One leading Russian diplomat wrote at the time to his brother that it was “a result of the legitimate influence of our Emperor that Germany and Europe are at peace.” In the 1930s, later British Prime MinisterWinston Churchill believed that the rise of Nazism would have been arrested if British policy towards Germany had not been “decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, [and] all-powerful to be impotent.”
This chapter focuses on the British attempt to thwart German imperialism in 1938–1939. It examines British threats, offers and assurances and the German high command reactions. It considers what the British did, and what they might have done. Through a systematic analysis of documentary material, it evaluates the signaling hypotheses against the documentary record of determinants of German perceptions of British intentions, from the posturing over the Czechoslovakia question to the start of the Second World War.
The series of cases embodied in German views of British intentions in 1938–1939 are well-suited to evaluating the signaling hypotheses for three principal reasons. First, the facts of the cases correspond closely to the setup of the formal models and, of particular note in this regard, the bargaining involved decisions about the scope of demands. In the crises over both Poland and Czechoslovakia, the sides negotiated over several recognized options to settle the disputes and the parties had opposite preference rankings over these possible outcomes. Prior to diplomatic signaling, both sides were also believed by the other to be relatively unlikely to be willing to make maximalist concessions. Thus, the basic facts of the case suggest informative costless signaling based on the Scope of Demand mechanism.
PART I - THEORY
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 45-46
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2 - How Perceptions of Intentions Form
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 22-44
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Summary
The material and ideational structure of the state system does not limit states to a single reasonable course of action in all instances, and possibly not in any instances. In order to set their own strategies in world affairs, therefore, states attempt to figure out the plans and intentions of other states. As we have seen, the question of war or peace is often thought to hinge on how these perceptions form.
This chapter provides a systematic overview of these processes by analyzing data from the Confidential Print of the British Empire between 1855 and July of 1914. This provides a baseline against which the role of diplomacy in shaping perceptions can be evaluated. The data show the frequencies of inferences from different sources and allow for comparisons of how different types of inferences are drawn in different international political contexts. Analysis of this data provides the first overarching view of how state leaders’ perceptions are formed. In spite of the recognized importance of the topic, no study has systematically examined how inferences are drawn from a variety of sources across a wide range of foreign policy contexts. With the data analyzed in this chapter, we can distinguish, for the first time, the sorts of inferences that are made infrequently or by less consequential actors in world politics from those inferences that constitute daily life in the international system.We can see not just how states could draw inferences, but how leaders and diplomats actually develop perceptions of the likely future behavior of other actors. I examine how state leaders are reassured that another state is not aggressive, how leaders draw inferences about the use of force, and whether inferences in crises are drawn from different sources than inferences outside of crises. The data provide a picture of how the intersubjective space of state perceptions of intention is constructed.
The Confidential Print is a record of documents circulated by the British Foreign Office to the cabinet, officials of the Foreign Office, and the King and Queen. The British Foreign Office had principal responsibility for the formulation of British foreign policy since 1782, and from the 1850s, nearly every important Foreign Office document was included.
References
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp 269-283
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6 - Diplomatic Approaches
- from PART I - THEORY
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 128-146
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Summary
When Japan told Britain, at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, that Japan would not come to an adjustment of differences with Russia, British statesmen were genuinely reassured. They concluded that they could adopt a stronger negotiating position in talks on a cooperative arrangement with Japan. Why did the British draw this conclusion from the Japanese signal and, more puzzlingly, if the British could have been expected to draw this conclusion, why did the Japanese send the signal?
Following the Crimean War, Russian attempts to cultivate close relations with France were a factor in convincing the British that Russia would not help Austria–Hungary in the Second Italian War of Independence. The Russian overtures to France were proof that Russian hostility was greater towards Austria, which had been Russia's ally before the war, than it was toward the powers against which Russia had actually fought in the war. Beyond convincing the British that Russia was resentful towards Austria, which European powers already had reason to understand, Russian diplomacy helped to persuade the British that this resentment would have a significant impact on Russian policy. No public alliance signing was required for these conclusions to be drawn. In fact, diplomats around Europe were able to read the implications of the private diplomatic encounters of which they, through their own networks, became aware. Similarly, in 1910 and 1911, when Germany offered Britain an expanded and exclusive sphere of influence in Persia, the British concluded that Germany wanted a “free hand” in dealing with France and Russia and other neutral powers. Why did the British conclude in these cases that Russia was more hostile to Austria and Germany more hostile towards France and Russia, than the British had believed previously?
This chapter demonstrates that a very simple mechanism allows for inferences of this sort in systems of states. Further, many inferences that may appear very different in kind are in fact similar and can be understood as the results of identical processes of reasoning by the actors involved.
7 - The Fruit of 1912 Diplomacy
- from PART II - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 151-173
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Summary
In precipitating a European war in 1914, the Austrian Emperor followed the advice of all of his most senior counselors save one. The Emperor knew his actions were likely to result in a titanic clash between at least four great powers of Europe. He knew he risked the very existence of his centuries-old empire. And yet, the decision was not directly forced upon him. The German Chancellor had written that “the German Emperor cannot take a position on the current issues between Austria–Hungary and [Serbia], as it is a matter not within his competence” but Germany would “faithfully stand by” Austria. Later, the German emperor advocated an alternative to war, known as the “Halt in Belgrade” proposal; Britain advocated a similar solution. It was Austria that insisted on the course that it knew would bring on the war, and the result was the destruction of the state and the Habsburg dynasty. At the war's end, it was left to an American captain to tell an Austrian Archduke that he would never return to power in Hungary. Captain T. C. Gregory cabled home: “Archie on the carpet 7 P.M. went through the hoop at 7:05.” Why did the Austrians hazard their place in the world? What made them willing to bring on a modern, mechanized war, deaths in the tens of millions, a storm of steel?
The answers to these questions are found, in large part, in what the European powers learned from prewar diplomacy. Diplomacy played the major part in the formation of the actors’ beliefs about each other's intentions and these intersubjective understandings formed the essential elements of the arguments for war. Diplomacy allowed the powers to understand that France would support Russia in a war against the Triple Alliance and eventually convinced Germany that England would join Germany's adversaries. But roots of the conflict can be found further back in European diplomacy. The threats Austria made to Russia during the Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth century, threats that were never acted upon, engendered the enmity between Russia and Austria, and thereby played a significant role in the creation of the German state as Russia shifted to favor Prussia over Austria. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the diplomacy of other powers often left Austria relatively isolated, save for its close relationship with Germany after 1879.
Appendix B - The Inference Dataset
- from APPENDICES
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 259-260
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Summary
The database comprises inferences drawn in the Confidential Print of the British Government between 1855 and July, 1914 about the securityrelated behavior and intentions of other great powers in Europe. The other European great powers were: Austria–Hungary, France, Germany, and Russia. The inferences were drawn from letters, memoranda, dispatches, speeches, and other documents deemed important enough by the British Foreign Office to be included in its archive, known as the Confidential Print. Inferences were classified as “security-related” if they concerned relative power, decisions about the use of force, alliance politics or influence or control over territory. Inferences about economic matters were also included when these were presented as affecting security concerns.
Documents of substantive importance from these years have been included in three published documents collections. The first is the wellknown British Documents on the Origins of the War (ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley), a 13-volume set containing many of the most important documents from the years 1898–1914. The second documents collection is the series of “blue” and “white” books (named for the distinctive color of their covers) offered to Parliament and published as Parliamentary Papers. The third collection of papers is the largest: Documents on British Foreign Policy. The editors of this documents collection have ensured that the material consists only of documents that are unavailable in the other two collections. Together, these three collections provide a comprehensive record of all substantively important documents from the Confidential Print over this time period.
An observation in the dataset is an inference by the British about another European power. Inferences were defined by both the ground or cause of the inference and the conclusion drawn. If multiple inference causes were listed for the same conclusion, multiple observations were coded. Similarly, if one cause resulted in two conclusions, this was coded as two observations. In the case that a single action or state of affairs resulted in inferences about the behavior of three states, that was coded as three observations. If an identical inference was drawn on multiple occasions, only the first instance was coded as an observation and the number of identical inferences was listed as a variable.
9 - Statistical Analysis of Diplomatic Communication
- from PART II - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- Diplomacy
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 192-211
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This chapter turns to the statistical analysis of communication. It examines the signaling hypotheses and a range of fundamental questions about international affairs. In the last two chapters, we saw that private encounters influence the calculations of state actors in some cases, but are these the exception or the rule? Do public statements regularly convince in a way that private encounters do not? How does the context of alliance relations and material power influence the credibility of demands? Do the judgments formed from diplomatic signals or material factors merely confirm inferences drawn from the other domain? In other words, is one set of factors a leading indicator of state intentions? These and other questions are addressed using first-of-its-kind data on the public and private statements of diplomats and state leaders. The analyses of this data bear out the predictions of the theoretical models, in some instances in provisional fashion, where the data are limited, and in other instances, where the data are plentiful, with substantial confidence.
DEMANDS, OFFERS AND ASSURANCES DATA
To examine the signaling hypotheses statistically, data were collected on all demands, offers and assurances of which the British were aware, made by European great powers to other European great powers between 1900 and 1914. Like the inference dataset described previously, these data were drawn from the Confidential Print of the British Empire. The data comprise 955 unique statements, 83 percent of which were made by diplomats and leaders away from view of their publics. Slightly more than half of these statements were offers or assurances and the rest were threats or demands. If the same demand or assurance was made by the same state and to the same state on multiple occasions, this was coded as a single observation. More detailed information on data collection procedures and coding rules for all of the variables discussed in this chapter can be found in Appendices B and C.
In combination with the inference data, this data enable a more precise test of hypotheses than has been possible in previous studies. Not only has most scholarship focused on public signaling, it has also nearly exclusively examined the connection between statements and whether an adversary makes a concession. A finding that certain factors are associated with concessions is taken as evidence that those factors are associated with the credibility of threats.
Preface
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp xi-xiv
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Summary
The aim of this book is to show how a few inferential logics explain most of what diplomats and leaders learn from their conversations. In ever denser networks of diplomatic exchange, across diverse contexts in the international system, time and again, fundamentally similar dynamics recur. The conclusions that state representatives reach shape decisions for war and how they understand the international order of the day.
The earliest elements of the argument evolved out of thinking about the trepidation with which diplomats and state leaders make demands. Often, their principal concern is not that their threats will not be believed, but what will happen when they are. This is common to alliance politics and nuclear brinkmanship, to attempts to deter and attempts to compel. It is important because the reasons some demands are not made, and others are not made lightly, are also the reasons they are meaningful at all. The fact that a leader does not hold back, in spite of reasons to do so, shows just how important an issue is.
“Obviously,” US President John F. Kennedy told his advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “you can't sort of announce that in four days from now you're going to take [the missiles] out.” Why–what prevented this threat of attack in four days from being made? Was it that the threat might not be credible? No. Such a threat could not be made lightly because of the escalatory dynamic that could result when the Soviets took the threat seriously, because “they may announce within three days that they're going to have [nuclear] warheads on them.” Kennedy worried about what the Soviets would do in response precisely because they would find the threat credible. This was a form of brinkmanship, but it could be carried on through private meetings and telegraph messages, and the danger was not of an accidental slide into conflict, but of what the sides would do intentionally in response to new information from their adversaries.
At a far removed time and place and in a different international context, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was loath to make even the subtlest diplomatic threat to Russia, even over an issue he considered essential to German security.
Appendix C - Demands, Offers, and Assurances Dataset
- from APPENDICES
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp 261-262
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Summary
The data comprise all demands, offers, and assurances that occurred between 1900 and the start of the World War in 1914 that are noted in the British Confidential Print and (1) were made by European great powers other than Britain to European great powers and (2) were classified as “security-related.” The European great powers of the day were: Austria–Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. If the British were not witness to a demand, offer, or assurance (hereafter a TOA) by another power to a third power, but the British took it for granted that a TOA had occurred, this was also coded. TOAs from a great power to a non-great power were also coded if observers took it for granted that the non-great power was so closely connected to a great power that the TOA was equally made to that great power. TOAs were classified as “security-related” if they concerned relative power, decisions about the use of force, alliance politics or influence or control over territory. TOAs about economic matters were also included when these were presented as affecting security concerns. If precisely the same TOA was made on multiple occasions, the first instance was coded as an observation and the total number of identical TOAs was listed as a variable.
A full codebook is available on the author's website, but I shall note how certain variables were coded here. TOAs were classified as demands when the proposal was known to be against the preference of the state to which the statement was made and as offers otherwise. If an inference was made as a result of a TOA, this was coded in the same observation and categorized in a number of different ways that allow for the variety of distinctions drawn in the text. The Inference Certainty variable was coded either 1, 2, or 3, based on the words used in the drawing of the inference as follows:
1 Words such as “might,” “may,” and “possibly.” Examples of specific phrases that merited this coding include: “if a Great Power motions for disarmament, Germany might suggest that armaments be proportional to a country's population,” and “If Russia were to meet Austria's wishes in this matter it might dispose her to yield on the question of Djakova.”
Appendix A - Proofs for Chapters 3–6
- from APPENDICES
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp 229-258
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Dedication
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp v-vi
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APPENDICES
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp 227-228
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3 - The Scope of Demands
- from PART I - THEORY
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 25 October 2017
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- 26 October 2017, pp 47-70
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Summary
When the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia dreamt of forming Italy in 1859, it set about forging a secret alliance with France, inspiring insurrections in Austria's Italian provinces, and conducting military maneuvers close to the Austrian border. The Austrians mobilized in response and war appeared likely. A compromise proposal was floated by the Powers according to which the Austrians would pull their troops back from the boarder in return for Piedmontese demobilization. In private diplomatic communications, the Austrians rejected this compromise, insisting the Piedmontese demobilize first. In cases such as this, costless communication is difficult, and is often thought to be impossible. All parties knew what the Austrians wanted; what they did not know initially was whether Austria was willing to fight rather than accept a compromise. Why should words uttered in private convince anyone? Austria had incentive to make the more substantial demand even if it were not willing to fight over the matter. But nevertheless, observers did learn from the Austrian refusal. The British ambassador to Austria even concluded that he had “not the smallest hope that the Austrian Government will agree to any such [compromise].” How did observers reach this conclusion?
The ambassador may have drawn this inference because he believed that Austria, having made the threat, would not have wanted to be caught in a bluff, but this could be said of every threat and diplomats sometimes believe that threats lack credibility. Although a range of factors certainly affected the ambassador's conclusion, he likely made the following simple inference: in demanding more, Austria had given up the opportunity to achieve a compromise solution that Austria believed Piedmont was much more likely to have conceded without fighting; therefore, Austria is resolved to fight for the more substantial demand. Through this mechanism, the scope of state demands commonly conveys information about resolve to adversaries in international politics.
Despite literature in international relations that argues the contrary, such simple inferences are often quite rational in diplomatic relations. This chapter analyzes a model similar to Fearon (1995) in order to demonstrate that higher demands can increase perceptions of a state's resolve to fight for more favorable outcomes when two conditions hold. First, when negotiations produce a peaceful outcome, both sides must share in the bargaining surplus from avoiding war.
1 - Can Adversaries Communicate?
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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- 26 October 2017, pp 1-21
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The relationship between Austria and Russia was without hint of conflict in the first half of the nineteenth century. Austrians wept with joy when Russia offered military assistance against the Hungarians, and the Austrian Emperor traveled to Warsaw, where he knelt on one knee to kiss the Tsar's hand. The two powers signed an agreement to conduct their foreign policies “only together and in a perfect spirit of solidarity,” and the Tsar told foreign diplomats, “when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well.” Yet, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the two empires were in constant tension, and often directly at odds. Russia offered aid and support against Austrian interests, first to Sardinia and Prussia, enabling those states to form Italy and Germany, and later to Serbia and other Balkan powers, leading to the World War. This dramatic shift in Russian policy towards Austria happened suddenly in the 1850s and did not result from changes in national capabilities or material interests; what brought it about?
Another important shift in European politics occurred during the Great Eastern Crisis in 1876. Germany and Russia had previously had the closest of relations, while Germany and Austria had fought a war a decade before. Yet, during the Great Eastern Crisis, a rift formed between Germany and Russia, while Germany and Austria–Hungary drew closer together. The German statesman, Otto von Bismarck, was convinced that the words his ambassador to Russia had uttered to the Tsar had brought about this “new situation” in Europe. Soon after, Germany signed the alliance with Austria that lasted until both Empires were destroyed fighting side by side in the cataclysm of the First World War. What did produce this new situation and how did it then convince Germany and Austria to bind themselves in a rare, permanent alliance despite having recently fought each other in a war?
The twentieth century contains many examples of similar shifts in leaders’ beliefs and policies with lasting consequences. At the turn of the century, for instance, Russo-Austrian relations were merely conflictual, but by 1914, the Austrian emperor had come to believe that Russian policy aimed at “the destruction of my empire.” Austrian statesmen, who had previously rated Germany an unreliable ally, came to believe instead during the July Crisis that Germany could be relied upon in an existential struggle.
Frontmatter
- Robert F. Trager, University of California, Los Angeles
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